Norbert Elias's early work -specifically Idea and Individual -offers a positive account of philosophy's potential contribution towards a historically-oriented concrete sociological investigation. His later work, on the other hand, characterises philosophical investigation as little more than a distraction from the myth-exposing vocation of the (figurational) sociologist. This later 'post-philosophical' account of figurational sociology predominates today. Within this article, however, I suggest it has come to prominence through a series of dubious rhetorical strategies, most notably sub-textual hearsay and disingenuous caricature. 
Figurational sociology against philosophy
A two and a half page introduction to the turbulent life of a great thinker greets the reader of each of the already published volumes of Norbert Elias's collected works. The short piece recites a series of important dates, locations, acquaintances, difficulties, achievements and so on, generally serving to give a provisional sense for the life and work of the man -all standard fare for curtain raisers of this nature. Among the key points offered for the sake of situating this crucial sociologist's work against an appropriate historical and biographical backdrop we learn from the series editors that Elias: wrote his doctoral thesis in philosophy, graduating in 1924, but not before having become highly critical of what he saw as the philosophers' failure to recognise the importance of the creation and transmission of knowledge as an intergenerational learning process, and ultimately rejecting philosophy as a discipline. (Norbert Elias Foundation, 2006: vii, 2005: vii and etc.) The characterisation of Elias's work as justifiably critical of philosophy is by no means isolated to the above brief note of doubtlessly welcome contextualisation. On the contrary, it has served as one of the recurring themes through which Elias commentators have helped orientate those making their way into figurational sociology. Consider some of the more influential instances of textual evidence. Johan Goudsblom's Sociology in the Balance (1977) , the earliest exclusively English book length introduction to Elias's work, polemically highlighted the need for sociologists to overcome philosophy, in the way of Elias, for the sake of maintaining their inherently precarious discipline. Stephen Mennell's Norbert Elias: An Introduction (1992: 181-199) , without doubt the seminal secondary introduction to Elias's work, 1 elaborated upon the rationale underpinning Elias's anti-philosophical disposition.
More recently, Richard Kilminster's Post-Philosophical Sociology (2007) (2011: 12) . These four examples, of which many more could have been offered, help illustrate a point which is as clear as it is resounding: Elias's sociology has overcome philosophy and its followers must learn this crucial lesson.
This article develops an alternative account of figurational sociology's postphilosophical self-regard by opposing both the notion that Elias's work has overcome philosophy as well as the notion that such an achievement is in principle desirable. In both respects the argument which I develop here will treat Elias scholarship's post-philosophical motif as a primarily rhetorical matter, rather than as one which is grounded in robust argumentation. This involves the performance of two interrelated tasks. Firstly, it involves offering a textually supported assertion that Elias's sociology has not legitimately severed its ties from philosophy. Secondly, it involves opposing the enthusiastic subscription to the belief that Elias's work has definitively broken with philosophy with an explanation as to why this enthusiasm is presently ill-/under-advised.
To state matters more concretely: advocates of Norbert Elias's sociology routinely oppose the very suggestion that contemporary sociologists should respond to philosophical queries about their knowledge claims. This article opposes this position not because it is my intention to pedantically find flaw with it but rather because it is my intention to discuss the debilitative consequences of such a dismissive characterization of philosophy. I write neither from the perspective of a philosopher patronizingly approaching the question of sociology's disciplinary autonomy from the outside nor from the perspective of a rival sociological tradition's representative set on defending its own articulation of the philosophy/sociology relationship from within the confines of its own barricades. My starting point and ambitions
here are a lot more modest, namely, to demonstrate how rhetorical motifs buttress the belief that figurational sociology has done away with philosophy, without its actually having done so. To call these motifs into question is not a gratuitous act of destruction, therefore. Rather, it is an attempt to resurrect a debate between philosophy and figurational sociology through a demystification of one its most persistent barriers.
If, on the other hand, it was indeed the case that Elias's work offered a definitive break with philosophy, as his advocates repeatedly claim, then we should all readily embrace the post-philosophical consequences of such a break, as described. The problem, though it need not be a terminal one, is that Eliasian scholars seem to have systematically ignored the ways in which their claim towards post-philosophical sanctuary may not actually be based upon secure foundations. More regularly, as will be demonstrated, they have devoted time and effort to outlining a defence of themselves against philosophical rebuttals on the basis of rhetorical tropes. In this article I discuss the two most persistent of these -mandarinism and homo clausus -and then go on to suggest, quite straightforwardly, that Eliasian scholars would be better advised to contemplate the possibility that their allegations against philosophy might not be well founded, rather than defiantly laboring the point that the final word, on philosophy, has long ago already been had, by sociology.
History, 'the idea', Kant and community

5
There is no object of historical research -so it has been argued in all these reflections -which does not confront the historian with the necessity of reflecting on the principle of his own procedure. (Elias, 2006a: 46 (Kilminster, 2006: xi) . This section overviews these two important pieces in particular, rather than the assembled contents of the book more generally, because it is within these texts, as we have already seen above, that
Elias is said to have become highly critical of philosophy. These two texts, at least if the official account is to be believed, serve to usher in an era within which an ultimate rejection of philosophy has become sanctioned. Given the stated intentions of this paper, it makes sense to closely consider the arguments they offer to this effect.
Idea and individual: a critical investigation of the concept of history, Elias's doctoral
thesis, considers what, to contemporary sociological sensitivities, might seem a somewhat peculiar problem, namely, the extent to which Kantian philosophy offers an appropriate foundation for historical investigation. This basic concern doesn't seem nearly so esoteric, of course, when one takes into account the fact that Elias's dissertation supervisor, Richard
Hönigswald, was a neo-Kantian philosopher and that the study was being undertaken precisely around a time where neo-Kantianism held powerful sway within the German university system. As we will see in the next section, the little commentary which does exist on this particular text frequently draws pronounced attention to such socio-contextual factors as a means of coming to terms with its role within figurational sociology's overall development. Once we have overviewed the argument itself we can then turn to the question of how determinative such extra-textual factors can be legitimately permitted to be.
The text begins by drawing attention to a canonical concern within historiography. On the one hand, history can simply mean all of the past -that unregulated swell and swirl of previous events, each of which has already happened. On the other hand, history can also mean the specialised mode of investigation into the seeming chaos of the past which discovers structural regularities by means of progressive self-refinement. How might we reconcile these two notions of history? The historian, for Elias, takes initial bearings from and subsequently contributes towards a constantly developing viewpoint. It is on the basis of the status of this viewpoint at a given moment that meaningful selections can be made as to 'what is historically significant ' (2006a: 24) . In order to know what is and is not historically significant, Elias insists, 'it is important, above all, that the historian should know what is to be understood by an "idea"' (ibid.). The challenge for every historian, and hence for Elias, is to become aware of the status of 'the idea' in order to interpret the significance of any given individual historical fact upon its basis. This challenge is above all a methodological one -it is a question of how to do historical investigation:
From the solution to this problem historians may expect to gain clarity on the principle of historical selection and on the legitimacy of their own procedure, while philosophers may hope to gain insight into the structure of history and proof of the claim to truth which historical judgments require.
History and philosophy come together, therefore, in their common interest in the idea (Elias, 2006a: 25 (Kant, 1998) establishes the ways in which the rationally knowable is subjectively-structurally conditioned, it simultaneously acknowledges from the outset how reason constantly seeks to 8 overcome its own structurally inherent limits (Kant, 1998: 99-105 The gradually advancing severance of the idea from motifs of universality, which was brought to a relative conclusion in the Critique of Judgment, is also the task of the modern philosophy of history, if it seeks to establish a critical science of history. A study of the development of the Kantian problem of the idea would therefore directly benefit the work of systematic philosophy. (Elias 2006a: 29) Elias's main debt to The Critique of Judgment, in particular, is to its notion of 'the purposiveness of nature' (Kant, 1987: 20-36) as a condition for the experience of nature, that is to say, to its delineation of a form of thought which establishes connections between individual events and a broader structure as such (Elias, 2006a: 30 the historian will need to understand the dialectical process of a totality when investigating an individual element within it ... the dialectical process, encompassing everything that claims validity, is that particular order through which historical facts are connected to each other; it is the order of history.
( 2006a: 38) This dialectical process, as Elias calls it, is a process in which historical investigation questions the subjective and objective conditions of its own existence and the existence of that which it is treating as historically significant. This questioning initially finds the individual on the side of the subject and the idea on the side of the object. Subsequently, idea and individual become understood as two sides of the same historical process by the historian. That is to say, on the one hand, the idea is questioned by an 'I'. On the other hand, the scope for the questions asked by the questioning 'I' are determined by previous questioners -historians as well as historical figures. Elias's entire dissertation, by taking this two-sidedness of historical enquiry as a methodological problem which requires rigorous theorisation, can be understood as a demonstration of how the idea and the individual are to be understood as two sides of the same dialectical process, a process which, for him, is 'nothing other than the object of the science of history' (ibid.: 39).
Since the object of historical research is the historical dialectical process within which a questioner comes to reconcile their own questions with a longer going tradition of questioning, the task for the historical researcher, according to Elias, is to illuminate the various dimensions of the historical dialectical process itself. Elias mentions three such dimensions and it is towards these which subsequent historical investigation, according to him, should be targeted:
Firstly, it is directed at a particular individual fact; then it has to test the idea according to which that fact has been derived and, thirdly, it has to investigate the premises of this particular concept of the idea, i.e. the premises of certain historical judgments. Only then -and precisely this is its purpose -does the The recognition of the predicament of the historian as one which is bound to raise issues germane to philosophy, to psychology and to differing notions of community brings Elias towards the realisation that his task, as well as the task of any critical historiography, is 'to look more deeply into the structure of society... ' (ibid.: 53) . It is precisely at the point at which Elias has acknowledged the sheer scope of the task facing critical historiography, and of the role played by society within it, that the manuscript regrettably breaks off. to it an articulation of the role of community as an explicatory factor of individual and collective experience. We might then say that Elias created a conceptual and methodological edifice upon which he based the subsequent work which has gained him broad following and respect. Uncontroversial as this account of the productive role played by philosophy within the development of Elias's project might seem to the uninitiated, as well as to the author of this paper, however, it doesn't find much favour within existing commentary.
'Mandarinism' as anecdotalism
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According to Richard Kilminster, the sui generis proponent of the view that figurational sociologists owe little other than disdain to philosophy (e.g. Kilminster, 2011 Kilminster, , 2007 Kilminster, , 2004 Kilminster, , 2002 Kilminster, , 1991 Kilminster, , 1987 Kilminster and Wouters, 1995) , such an account of Idea and Individual's seemingly pro-Kantian remarks commits the error of taking them much too literally. Kilminster insists we approach Idea and Individual less with the benefit of exegetical illumination and more through the light of some not initially apparent sociocontextual factors. The remainder of this section elaborates upon this position before characterizing it less as a defensible argument and more as dogmatic rhetoric. Once we understand any given work as a response to the dilemmas and opportunities experienced by its author and, by extension, by a broader figuration of interdependent human beings, so the sociology of knowledge's argument goes, we gain much greater insight into it than we would have done by abstracting it from that context and engaging with it upon textual terms alone. Along these lines, Kilminster has developed his sociology of figurational sociology's opposition to philosophy (see also Goudsblom, 1987; and Gabriel and Mennell, 2011 Kant's moral philosophy is evidently rooted in a sense of duty to others (Kant, 1996a (Kant, , 1996b (Kant, , 1996c . Epistemologically, the claim also makes no sense when we realize, following the previous section, that Idea and Individual can be understood as a non-individualist instance of neo-Kantianism. Secondly, we would also have to believe neo-Kantian philosophy wasn't interested in 'concrete reality', rather than appreciating how the accessibility of reality, concrete or otherwise, was an indispensible impetus for Kantian philosophy's 'Copernican turn' (Kant, 1998: 106-124 ). Kant was entirely obsessed with, rather than arrogantly disinterested in, 'concrete reality', that he believed we didn't have access to it wasn't a dogmatic component of his system but a logical one. Thirdly, we would also have to believe that all Kantians were neo-Kantians, which they obviously were not (Heidegger, 1997) .
Finally, we would also have to believe that 'the existentialists' sought to replace a discredited Kantianism, a claim which is wrong for at least two reasons -firstly, because Kantianism was never 'discredited', at least not in this chronologically developmental sense -even 
The arrogance of homo clausus
In the previous section we called the belief that figurational sociology has overcome philosophy into doubt by highlighting the dubiety of the core assumptions upon which it is based. What we have not yet considered, however, is the questionability, or otherwise, of the arguments which Elias and his followers make against philosophy, for sociology. This will be our concern within the present section.
Elias's core objection to philosophy, as Stephen Mennell outlines it, is that it engages
with what amounts to a false problem in the name of epistemology -the problem of thinking how it is possible for a subject to know an object, in part, or at all (Mennell, 1992: 188-193 ).
This problem is something of a red herring, for Elias, because it is based upon a false separation of what must always be understood as interconnected aspects of a broader historical process: the would-be knowers and the would-be known. We cannot ever hope to understand knowledge dissemination if we believe, along with philosophers, that knowledge is an object which we, as individual subjects, are born separate from and hope to subsequently come into contact with. We must therefore abandon philosophy's false stating of the problem of knowledge, according to Elias, in order to make it possible to approach sociology's more correct one. To quote Mennell: In his discussion of homo clausus (1968a: 245-63 [2000]; 1970a: 119ff [1978]; 1982a: 6-17, 27-32 [1982]; 1984c: 15-16 [1984]; 1987a [1991a] ) Elias enters into some detail about the varying manifestations of this static duality between 'subject' and 'object'. It is always associated with a doubt that the world 'outside', 'external reality', really exists or is as it seems [Additional bibliographic details added in parentheses]. (Mennell, 1992: 189) What epistemology ultimately fails to consider, on the figurational account, is the inherently inter-generational and demonstrably relational character of knowledge production and dissemination, insisting instead upon a somewhat unsettling vision of isolated individual human beings, each trapped within their own discrete worlds. Wherever philosophical accounts of knowledge do hold sway, you can be sure -according to figurational sociologists -the image of man as homo clausus won't be too far away. As Mennell puts it: 'The pervasive influence of homo clausus is detected everywhere by Elias' (ibid.: 191) . If we want to understand what knowledge actually is, and how it is actually produced, we would be better advised to take our bearings from a sociologically sensitive programme of developmental psychology, for example (ibid.: 193; see also Gabriel, 2011) , rather than from the abstract and needlessly dualistic speculations of philosophy. Epistemology, on this reading, is inherently a-historical and solipsistic. Sociological theories of knowledge, on the other hand, are inherently reality-congruent.
Whilst philosophy in general is treated as guilty in this regard, it is again Kantian philosophy, in particular, which gets put upon exegetical trial. 4 Underlining the crux of the problem with recourse to the claim that philosophy cannot think inter-generational knowledge transmission, whereas sociology can -or at least could -Mennell argues:
Kant, it must be remembered, like everyone else argued with a language he had learned socially. He asked 'where does my concept of "cause" come from?' He was right that he had not learned it by himself. But he had learned it from his teachers. The concept of cause was there in his society. Several generations earlier it had not been. It had gone through a long process of development in society, the intergenerational transmission of symbols slowly adding to the stock of knowledge and of the categories available for use in thinking by people in society. (1992: 193) In as much as this passage helps clarify the nature of Elias's reservations against philosophy, it also conveys his ability to fundamentally misrepresent Kant's project. Within the remainder of the section I will do two things about this. Firstly, I will demonstrate why the above amounts to a fundamental misrepresentation of Kant. Secondly, I will underline how Elias is more than aware of how this sort of argument amounts to a fundamental misrepresentation of
Kant, yet arrogantly makes it anyway. I close the section by suggesting that the arrogance of such a self-imposed ignorance only serves to reinforce the suggestion, made in the previous section, that figurational sociology's arguments against philosophy are more dogmatic than definitive.
The misrepresentation of Kant on cause
Kant was not the first person to ask what the concept of cause was, nor was he the first to enquire where that concept came from. Speculations on causation go back to the preSocratics, at least (Kenny, 2010 ). Kant's own engagement was a specific response to the work which Descartes, Newton, Leibniz and above all Hume had also been doing around his time. As Kant himself puts it:
I tried first whether Hume's objection could not be put into a general form, and soon found that the connection of cause and effect was by no means the only concept by which the understanding thinks the connection of things apriori ... This deduction ... was the most difficult task ever undertaken in the service of metaphysics. (Kant, 2001: 5) Kant is by no means blind to how the concept of cause has changed over the generations, therefore. He also knows very well that the way he thinks about cause is a by-product of the thinking of previous generations. Merely acknowledging how his enquiry into causation implies a longer lineage, however, wouldn't have helped Kant address the specific problems which he wanted to address -it would have simply re-stated what he already knew to have been obvious.
Let us consider the above cited passage, within which Kant puts so much stock in his attempt to rescue the concept of cause he inherited from David Hume's radical scepticism, in a little more detail. For Hume (2007 Hume ( , 1985 , our concept of cause is derived out of our everyday habits, rather than from scientific propositions and/or metaphysical speculations.
That is to say, we learn what cause is from experience: we couldn't even think in terms of cause if we hadn't first of all observed what we take to be a causal chain of occurrences. In
Hume's own famous example, if I see a billiard ball strike another billiard ball, whereby the second moves on impact, and if I witness this apparent chain of events occurring often enough, I will eventually form the habit of thinking that the event of striking causes the event of movement. According to Hume, then, I induce my concept of cause from experience: by observing one billiard ball striking another one often enough I come to believe that the former event causes the latter. The sceptical aspect of Hume's philosophy is to insist that there is no necessary connection between these two events and that our knowledge of causes, or of anything else at all, is largely a matter of common sense habit borne out of every day experience. About Hume's writing on cause Kant says the following:
The question was not whether the concept of cause was right, useful, and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature, for this Hume had never doubted; but whether that concept could be thought by reason apriori, and consequently whether it possessed an inner truth, independent of all experience, implying a more widely extended usefulness, not limited merely to objects of experience.
This was Hume's problem. (2001: 4) Following Hume's problem but ultimately proposing an alternative solution towards it, Kant argues that in order for us to even be able of having a concept of cause at all, it must be the case that there is something else which is apriori necessary, rather than aposteriori arbitrary, 
The arrogance of misrepresentation
it is more productive for the future of sociology if I go on working in the laboratory as I have done before, like a physicist who would go to his labour every day and do his stint instead of criticizing other physicists. (Elias, c.f. Kilminster, 1987: 215) .
The rudimentary aspects of Kant's writing on cause noted above will be familiar to anybody who has read Kant with the intention of coming to terms with his work. Figurational sociologists rarely read philosophy with the intention of doing anything other than impatiently dismissing it for not being sociology, however, so the above account may well be news to them. It wouldn't be news to Elias himself, however, who certainly knew that a project of intergenerational knowledge transmission could be generated on the basis of (1982: 104) Or again:
The image of human beings on which the whole fabric of philosophical epistemology rests is unsound. An ideal, that of a totally independent individual, of an 'I' without 'you' and 'we', the ideal of a passing period, is presented as if it were a timeless and universal fact. Descartes gave the signal: 'Cogito ergo sum.' What can be more absurd! Merely in order to say it, one had to learn a communal language; and why say it if no one was there to listen, to accept or reject it? (1987: xviii)
Elias is clearly something of a virtuoso in the dark art of disingenuously patronising philosophy. More often than not, however, what is better understood as battle-hardened rhetoric often ends up being treated as factual decree. This is not to say that there is absolutely no place for the banter-led parlour games of intellectual one-upmanship. It is only to say that once the fun has been had, it is important to get on with the serious work of separating the rhetoric of anti-philosophy out from the actual argument against philosophy.
This rarely happens. Elias knows philosophers don't erect the false idol of homo clausus in everything that they do. When he uses the term it is clear that he is offering a rhetorical caricature of a straw-man called philosophy, rather than presenting a reliable dismissal of everything ever done in the name of philosophy. Elias, as was well known, could be a very curmudgeonly defiant writer, particularly in his later work. As Richard Kilminster puts it:
In relation to the mainstream disciplines of philosophy, psychology, and history, the factions and schools within professional sociology, as well as towards This excessive reliance upon hubristic posturing at the expense of careful argumentation is obviously one of the most frustrating and off putting characteristics of his work. His obviously underdeveloped dismissal of philosophy is perhaps the clearest example of this.
Discussion
In one of his more modest moments, Elias highlighted the developmental nature of his own work and in so doing underlined the need for a lot more people, in a lot of different disciplines, to spend a lot more time working through the issues which it raised. Just as the civilising process is by no means complete, 6 so too, Elias insisted, the arguments laid out in
The Civilising Process cannot be treated as irrefutable propositions on the nature of all human societies that have anywhere ever been. The work initiated within Elias's most celebrated book, therefore, is by no means complete, rather:
It will need the thought of many people and the co-operation of different branches of scholarship, which are often divided by artificial barriers today, gradually to answer the questions that have arisen in the course of this study.
They concern psychology, philology, ethnology and anthropology no less than Given what we have read throughout this article, it should come as no surprise, and it was almost certainly no accident, that philosophy is omitted from this list of the requisite intellectual disciplines of the future. This article has attempted to suggest that this sort of omission is both gratuitous and premature. Such a wilful forgetting of philosophy, moreover, is hardly in keeping with figurational sociology's emphatic insistence upon the intergenerational processes of knowledge production and transmission (see also Elias, 1977: 67, c.f. Korte, 2001: 18 and Gabriel and Mennell, 2011) . What I have been trying to suggest throughout this article is that figurational sociology's opposition to philosophy requires re-visitation. I have spent most of my time in this regard challenging the widely held proposition that Elias's work amounts to a definitive dispensation with philosophy. To this effect I have argued that this proposition is largely rhetorical in nature, that once we pay careful attention to the textual and subtextual evidence for its claims, we find it severely wanting. This is not to say that figurational sociology cannot break with philosophy, it is only to say that the arguments which it has mobilised in support of this break remain debatable at best and spurious at worst. The suggestion that figurational sociology is best understood as a post-philosophical sociology amounts to an instance of the very sort of wishful thinking which Elias sought to free the sociologist from,
in that figurational sociologists have ended up believing and feeling we actually are what we ought to be and what we may even want to be. More precisely, we confuse fact with ideal, that which is with that which ought to be. (1978: 118) This need not be the case, however. An alternative to the repetition of Elias's indiscriminate and at times vicious attacks upon philosophy would be to actually read works of philosophy, much like the early Elias used to do, in order to consider their applicability to contemporary and long-term sociological problems, or otherwise. On the other hand, if figurational sociologists believe that their professional ends aren't best served by a careful engagement with philosophy, which many clearly do, the least they could do would be to stop disingenuously denouncing one of the longest going cultural traditions which mankind has ever known with recourse to cartoon-like representations of it, and instead just get on with the work of actually doing figurational sociology. ? (1978) , a text which Stephen Mennell himself translated, is the best primary introduction to Elias's work.
Notes
Elias's own What is Sociology
2.
Harste (1994) offers a rare if not exclusive exception to the rule which would have it that Elias's sociology must be seen as a fundamental break with, rather than a subtle continuation of, Kantian philosophy in particular and philosophy more generally.
3. This is not to say that Kilminster (or Elias, for that matter) systematically avoids supporting his position with recourse to textual evidence. On the contrary, Kilminster very clearly mentions an 'obvious contradiction' which exists between Elias's dissertation and its subsequent summary. For my part I cannot see the contradiction which Kilminster is alluding towards. If it does exist, it is in a far from obvious manner.
4.
The previous section has already drawn attention to the problems inherent in this operation of mistaking parts of philosophy for the whole of philosophy.
5. This is not to say that the early Elias struggled for confidence in his observational abilities. One need only consider his earliest published sentence for evidence to the effect that this was not a man who felt he required the vindication of others: 'I shall note down anything that occurs to me as worthy of recording' (Elias, 2006e: 3) .
6.
As is frequently pointed out within the literature, Elias speculated that 'our descendants, if humanity can survive the violence of our age, might consider us as late barbarians ' (1991b: 146-147 ).
